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INTRODUCTION 
Recently, the general pUblic and the media have paid 
much attention to the perceived polarization on welfare 
issues. As Everett Carll Ladd (1995) illustrates in Figure 
1, 3/4 of his sample of the general population agreed on the 
role of government in welfare in 1988. However, this 
consensus had disintegrated into a near polar split by 1994. 
Assessing Welfare Programs \ 
Question: Do you agree or disagree...• "It is the r.esponsibility ·or the government to take care or 
people who can't take care of themselves?" \ 
• agree 0 disagree \ 
1988II 1990 
Figure 1 74cro 
Source: Surveys by Princeton Survey Res=h Associates for the Times Mirror Center latest that ofJuly p.??
1994. . • - - • 
\E~~rett Carll Ladd, ~~he 1994 Congressional Elections: The Post­
industrial Realign~ent continues," p.12. 
Because the U.S. House of Representatives is supposedly most
 
responsive to popular opinion, the research here
 
investigates possible determinants of this trend as
 
manifested by our Representatives in the House. This
 
research postulates that not only divided government and the
 
decline of the conservative coalition, but also the Contract
 
with America contribute to the causation of party unity, and
 
Ultimately to the causation of party polarization on welfare
 
2
 
issues. Consequently, this research reveals that the 
conservative coalition did not decline, that the unity of 
both parties did increase after the Contract With America, 
and that the Democrats remain consistently more unified than 
the Republicans despite the perception that Republicans are 
more unified as a result of their Contract With America. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Much of the current literature implies that divided 
government and the decline of conservative coalition votes 
are correlated with an increase in party polarization on 
welfare votes in the House. Divided government has 
characterized American politics during much of the last 2~ 
decades (1968-1~92), with the executive traditionally 
dominated by Republicans and the House by Democrats. Morris 
P. Fiorina (1991) illustrates that this trend is 
demonstrated not only at the federal level, but also at the 
state level. Due to this divided government, both parties 
work to strengthen their party unity so that they are better 
able to battle their feirce opposition. For instance, in 
the 1970s, the Democrats revised the procedure by which 
their Caucus elected committee chairs, thus holding their 
leaders accountable to the entire party membership and 
enforcing party unity. The Republicans have since responded 
with resolve to tighten their ranks. As the parties become 
more unified and galvanized, they leave little room for 
compromise or moderate positions. In effect, they become 
polarized. 
•
 
As party unity increases, the frequency of conservative 
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coalition votes may be expected to decline because 
conservative Southern Democrats who used to vote with 
Republicans against Northern Democrats beginning in the 
1930s and 1940s, now either vote liberally with their own 
party or convert to the Republican party (Cooper and Brady, 
p.423). Some contend that the decline of conservative 
coalition votes is also attributable to the 1965 voting 
Rights Act which enabled larger numbers of black voters to 
reach the polls, thus making Southern Representatives more 
accountable to the traditionally liberal segments of their 
constituencies. But, Fleisher (1993) finds that even when 
controlling for such constituency variables like increased 
percentage of black liberal voters, the Americans for 
Democratic Action (ADA) and party unity scores of Northern 
Democrats still rise. Table 1 demonstrates this trend from 
M;.'\.N ADA AND P~ry U~ITYSUPPottr'SCORES NOR.THaRN AND SOUTHERN .\ 
DEMOCRATS 1981-1987 . 
Richard Fleisher, "~xplaininq thQ Change in Roll-Call 'voting Behavior 
of Southern D~mocrats,n p.332." 
•
 
1981 to 1987. While ADA and party unity scores for Southern 
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Democrats increased approximately 30 and 23 points 
respectively, Northern Democrats increased about 10 points 
on each set of scores. This emphasizes the fact that 
Northern Democrats who were largely unaffected by the 
increase in liberal black voters still became more liberal 
for reasons other than the 1965 voting Rights Act. 
Table 2 illustrates this partisan galvanization in both 
parties. As Bond and Fleisher (1995) demonstrate, since the 
Johnson administration in the 1960s, the extremely partisan 
factions of both parties have increased approximately 30 
Size of the Party Factions, First~Year Majority Presidents 
Pr~sid~n! 
Pusid~nJ's 
Bas~ 
Cross·Pressur~d 
Partisans 
Cross·Pnssurrd 
Oppon~nts 
Opposition 
Bas~ 
Housc 
Table 2 
Eiscnhower 
Kenncdy 
Johnson 
C:JItcr 
Qinlon 
Senale 
201 
188 
203 
223 
222 
19 
74 
91 
66 
36 
43 
31 
19 
21 
5 
170 
143 
121 
124 
li3 
\ 
Eiscnhower 
Kennedy 
Johnson 
Cutcr 
Reagan 
Clinlon 
36 
42 
51 
44 
43 
50 
12 
22 
16 
18 
10 
7 
13 
11 
4 
12 
13 
3 
35 
25 
29 
26 
34 
40 
Jon R. Bond and Richard Fleisher, "Clinton_ and Congress: A First­
Year Asse.ssment," p. 363 ~ 
points, while the two cross-pressured or moderate factions 
have substantially decreased. For these purposes, 
"cross-pressured" factions represent those groups who have 
conflicting and thus less polarized positions on issues 
studied. Rebecca C. Morton (1993) contends that this 
polarization is even more likely when Representatives have 
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incomplete information regarding voter policy preferences. 
Because of this party polarization, Agae Clausen argues that 
now "Party is the best single predictor of voting", 
especially on welfare issues (Clausen, p.275). 
THEORETICAL LOGIC 
Many authors agree with Clausen that welfare produces 
the greatest level of party polarization. Indeed, Bond and 
Fleisher (1995) find that when Congress voted on domestic 
issues such as welfare in 1993, Democrats supported the 
liberal position 54% of the time -- twice that of the 
Republicans. In other areas, Democrats and Republicans are 
more likely to support a moderate position, thus indicating 
a decrease in party unity and therefore party polarization 
as issues become less domestic. Because the positions of 
Republicans and Democrats are so divergent on welfare 
issues, their votes on such issues will probably be more 
partisan and polarized. Therefore, divided government and 
the decline of the conservative coalition may exacerbate 
party polarization on welfare votes in the House. 
The Contract With America is a product of the 
Republican party which represents the cUlmination of divided 
government. It not only synthesized the Republican agenda 
and promoted party organization, but its portrayal as a 
unifying force intimidated Democrats. Ladd (1995) notes 
that, although the Contract with America includes mostly 
Rules changes for House procedure, it created the perception 
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that Republicans are unified conservatively on every front, 
including welfare. This was accomplished by focusing the 
chaos of the 1994 Republican House takeover into a scheduled 
legislative agenda. The Contract with America publicized 
the Republicans' position on many issues, and House Speaker 
Newt Gingrich successfully brought these issues to a floor 
vote, as promised. This organization was especially 
impressive considering that Republicans had not been in 
positions of chamber leadership for many decades, and that 
32% of their party were freshmen (Ornstein and Schenkenberg, 
p.187). Due to the importance of the Contract With America 
and its role in the Republican takeover, this study 
investigates the years immediately before and after that 
event. 
The success of this type of initiative by the 
Republican leadership reflects high party unity. Indeed, 
according to Cooper and Brady (1981), the "impact of 
institutional context on leadership behavior is primarily 
determined by party strength". The Contract With America 
highlights this progressing trend in the House of increasing 
party unity. According to Charles o. Jones (1968), the 
Republicans attained success in this endeavor precisely 
because they parlayed their electoral majority into a 
procedural majority or "those necessary to organize the 
House for business" as well as a substantive majority or 
"those necessary to pass legislation". 
Ornstein and Schenkenberg (1995) further point out that 
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the Republicans' small majority of 230 require them to 
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maintain cohesiveness in order to fUlfill the agenda 
promised in the Contract With America. Jones' (1968) 
description of Cannon's Speakership in the early 1900s also 
applies to the mentality required to sustain the high degree 
of partisanship today: "Those members who reject the party 
leadership are rejecting the Republican party and its 
mandate from the people to manage the House and its work". 
This trend of ever-tightening party unity resembles that of 
an arms race, with each side attempting to out-do the other 
until eventually they galvanize into diametric opposition 
with no room for moderate positions. Therefore, divided 
government and increased party unity cUlminating in the 
Contract With America may lead to increased party 
polarization on welfare votes. 
However, these national-level explanations for 
increased party polarization such as divided government, 
conservative coalition decline, and the Contract With 
America may miss the broader picture. Fiorina (1991) points 
this out when he contends that "trends in state elections 
parallel to those in national elections raise suspicions 
that more general forces are at work and that existing 
explanations of divided government may be too 
level-specific". National-level explanations in the 
American context also fail to account for party polarization 
more genreally. For instance if divided national government 
causes polarization, then why does polarization occur in 
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parliamentary systems such as England where divided 
government cannot occur? This research acknowledges that 
fact and therefore merely attempts to identify possible 
causal factors at the national level only. 
METHODOLOGY 
This study is covers the 103rd and 104th Congresses 
which come directly before and after the Republican takeover 
of the House and the Contract with America. For, if 
polarization were ever to occur, it would be at this 
juncture. The unit of analysis is individual House members, 
and the type of data used are House roll-call votes from 
1993 to 1995. For the purposes of this study, welfare votes 
consist of partisan votes on issues like hunger, 
homelessness, Health and Human Services, as well as 
entitlements including Women, Infants, and Children (WIC), 
Aid to Families with Dependent Children, Supplemental 
Security Income, Medicare, and Medicaid. But they do not 
include abortion, veteran's benefits, Housing and Urban 
Development, or procedural votes. 
Procedural votes do not always reflect the actual 
conservative or liberal position of the House member. For 
instance, a Democrat may be in favor of a lioeral welfare 
bill, but if the Republican Rules Committee members impose 
restricting debate and amending procedures, then the 
Democrat will be forced to vote against the bill. It 
appears, then, that the Democrat has voted against the 
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liberal welfare bill when in actuality she has voted against 
the conservative Rules parameters. 
Three votes were chosen for each year of the study, 
culminating in a total of six votes for the 103rd Congress 
and three votes for the 104th Congress. Those for the 103rd 
Congress are as follows: 
1993 HR920: exempting unemployment compensation extensions 
from pay-as-you-go restrictions 
HR2518: appropriating funds for Health and Human 
Services 
HR3167: extending unemployment services 
1994 HR4606: appropriating funds for Health and Human 
Services 
HR8: re-authorizing WIC, school lunch, and other 
nutrition programs until 1998 
HR4604: establishing procedures for controlling 
entitlement expenditures 
Unfortunately, HR4606 and HR8 were ultimately dropped from 
the study because a majority of Democrats voted with a 
majority of Republicans, therefore violating the 
requirements of a party unity vote. This results in a total 
of 4 votes for the 103rd Congress. Those votes selected 
from the 104th Congress are as follows: 
1995	 HR4: overhauling the welfare program
 
HR1976: capping participation in the WIC program
 
HR4604: establishing procedures for controlling
 
entitlement expenditures 
The Representatives' positions on these votes are recorded 
in SPSS along with their party and region. Every liberal 
vote is scored as a 1 and every conservative vote is scored 
as a 0, thus establishing a welfare index. If a 
representative voted liberally on every issue in the 103rd 
Congress, she receives a score of 4 because the maximum 
liberal score is 4.0 for the 103rd Congress and 3.0 for the 
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104th Congress. The most conservative score for both 
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Congresses is 0.0. 
DATA ANALYSIS 
In the 103rd Congress, conservative coalition levels 
were very low. Congressional Quarterly reports that for the 
House alone, the conservative coalition existed on only 44 
out of 597 votes in 1993 and 36 out of 497 in 1994 to equal 
only 7%	 appearance (Almanac of 1994, p.6-C). 
As demonstrated by the following tables, the level of 
party polarization was as high as the conservative coalition 
scores were low. Table 3 shows that votes on HR920 resulted 
in 91.1% of Democrats voting liberally and opposing 84.4% of 
HR920 I Republican I Democrat I Total 
Conservative I I I 163 
Unemployment I 84.4% I 8.9% I 39.3% 
vote I I I 
Table 3	 Liberal I I I 252 
Unemployment I 15.6% I 91.1% I 60.7% 
Vote I I I 
I 167 I 248 I 415 
Total I 40.2% I 59.8% I 100% 
Chi Square Measure (Cramer's V) = .75, Significant at .01 
Republicans voting conservatively. More Republicans than 
Democrats defected. Table 4 shows a similar pattern for 
HR2518 I Republican I Democrat I Total 
Conservative I I I 123 
HHS Approp. I 62.1% I 7.0% I 28.9% 
Vote I I I 
Table 4	 Liberal I I I 302 
HHS Approp. I 37.9% I 93.0% I 71.1% 
Vote I I I 
I 169 I 256 I 425
 
Total I 39.8% I 60.2% I 100%
 
Chi Square Measure (Cramer's V) = .59, Significant at .01
 
11
 
•
 
HR2518 with 93% of Democrats voting liberally and opposing 
only 2/3 of Republicans who voted conservatively. Likewise 
in Table 5, HR3167 saw' 92.8% of Democrats voting liberally 
and opposing only about half of Republicans voting 
HR3167 / Republican / Democrat / Total 
Conservative / / / 96 
Unemploy. ext/ 50.3% / 7.2% / 24.4% 
Vote / / / 
Table 5	 Liberal / / / 297 
Unemploy. ext/ 49.7% / 92.8% / 75.6% 
Vote / / / 
/ 157 / 236 / 393 
Total / 39.9% / 60.0% / 100% 
Chi Square Measure (Cramer's V) = .49, Significant at .01 
conservatively. Table 6 illustrates the same thing for 
1994: 94.4% of Democrats voted liberally and again opposed 
about half of Republicans who voted conservatively. These 
findings show that party unity for Democrats was very high, 
usually	 approximating a 9 to 1 ratio of party supporters to 
party defectors. However, Republicans were not as unified, 
HR4604 / Republican / Democrat / Total 
Conservative / / / 107 
Entitlement / 55.7% / 5.6% / 25.5% 
Vote / / / 
Table 6	 Liberal / / / 312 
Entitlement / 44.3% / 94.4% / 74.5% 
Vote / / / 
/ 167 / 252 / 419 
Total / 39.9% / 60.1% / 100% 
Chi Square Measure (Cramer's V) = .56, Significant at .01 
with their highest ratio approximating 8 to 2 and falling as 
low as 1 to 1. Thus, Democrats demonstrated much greater 
party unity, even though Republicans were unified at least 
50% of the time. Finally, the indices for the 103rd 
12
 
•
 
Congress	 are displayed in Table 7. The number of Democrats 
who always voted liberally was nearly 3~ times greater than 
the number of Republicans who always voted conservatively. 
But, the	 two most conservative categories only equal 23.9% 
while	 the two most liberal categories equal 66.4%. All of 
these	 tables are statistically significant at the .01 level. 
Index	 / Republican / Democrat / Total 
0.00	 / 28.2% / 0.0% / 11.3% 42 
1.00 / 30.2% / 0.9% / 12.6% 47 
Table 7 2.00 / 18.8% / 3.6% / 9.7% 36 
3.00	 / 15.4% / 18.8% / 17.5% 65 
4.00	 / 7.4% / 76.7% / 48.9% 182 
/ 149 / 223 / 
Total / 40.1% / 59.9% / 100% 372 
Significance = .0166.4%. 
As of 25 November 1995, the conservative coalition 
existed on 102 out of 821 House votes for the 104th 
Congress, or 12.4%. This is obviously higher than the 7% 
for the 103rd Congress. Even though these figures 
contradict the theoretical logic by showing an increase 
rather than a decrease in the appearance of the conservative 
coalition thus far, the 104th Congress still demonstrates 
more part~ polarization than that of the 103rd Congress. 
HR1976 / Republican / Democrat / Total 
Conservative / / / 147 
WIC Cap / 64.3% / 0.5% / 34.8% 
Vote / / /
Table 8	 Liberal / / / 276 
WIC Cap / 35.7% / 99.5% / 65.2% 
Vote / / / 
/ 227 / 196 / 423
 
Total / 53.7% / 46.3% / 100%
 
Chi Square Measure (Cramer's V) = .66, Significant at .01
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The results for HR1976 in Table 8 echo those of the 
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103rd Congress with 99.5% of Democrats voting liberally and 
opposing	 only 64.3% of Republican who voted conservatively. 
Virtually no Democrats, but nearly a third of Republicans 
defected. But, for HR4 in Table 9, 95.5% of Democrats voted 
liberally and opposed 96.6% of Republicans who voted 
conservatively. HR2425 in Table 10 is also highly polarized 
HR4 I Republican I Democrat I Total 
Conservative I I I I 234 
Welfare I 96.6% I 4.5% I 54% 
Vote I I I 
Table 9	 Liberal I I I 199 
Welfare I 3.4% I 95.5% I 46% 
Vote I I I 
I 233 I 200 I 433 
Total I 53.6% I 46.2% I 100% 
Chi Square Measure (Cramer's V) = .92, Significant at .01 
with 97.5% of Democrats voting liberally and opposing 97% of 
Republicans voting conservatively. Finally, the indices for 
HR2425 I Republican I Democrat I Total 
Conservative I I I 231 
Medicare I 97% I 2.5% I 53.5% 
Vote I I I 
Table 10	 Liberal I I I 201 
Medicare I 3% I 97.5% I 46.5% 
Vote I I I 
I 233 I 199 I 432 
Total I 53.9% I 46.1% I 100% 
Chi Square Measure (Cramer's V) = .94, Significant at .01 
the 104th Congress are located in Table 11. A far greater 
percentage of Republicans were strictly conservative than in 
the 103rd Congress with 61.7% voting conservatively here. 
Democrats remained high in the strictly liberal category 
with 93.8%. However, this time the scales are more 
14
 
polarized with 53% in the two most conservative categories 
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and 47% in the two most liberal categories. Clearly, these 
votes are not necessarily representative of all votes, but 
Index	 / Republican / Democrat / Total 
/ / / 140 
0.00	 / 61.7% / 0.0% / 33.4% 
/ / / 82 
1.00	 / 35.2% / 1. 0% / 19.6% 
/ / / 16 
Table	 11 2.00 / 2.6% / 5.2% / 3.8% 
/ / / 181 
3.00	 / 0.4% / 93.8% / 43.2% 
/ 227 / 192 / 419 
Total / 54.2% / 45.8% / 100% 
Chi Square Measure (Cramer's V) = .96, Significant at .01 
they are consistent with the Congressional Quarterly's 
General Report and its statistics on party unity and 
partisanship for the first session of the 104th Congress. 
The conservative coalition scores do not concur with 
the theoretical logic. To date, the scores have risen 
approximately five points in the House from the 103rd to the 
104th Congresses. Even though this time frame is only a 
snapshot of the long-term trend of polarization, the data 
here shows that increased party polarization is not 
necessarily determined by a decrease in conservative 
coalition votes. However, this increase in conservative 
coalition votes may be due to the fact that it measures all 
conservative coalition votes, not just those on welfare 
issues as studied here. Despite these findings, other 
components of the theoretical logic have not been 
discredited. In fact, party unity on these welfare votes 
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increased after the Contract with America and the Republican 
takeover of the House. The Democrats maintain a higher 
degree of party unity than Republicans on these welfare 
votes both in the 103rd Congress when they held the majority 
as well as in the 104th Congress when they were in the 
minority. They consistently had approximately 90% party 
unity and very few defectors. This is underscored by the 
heavily-weighted liberal indices for Democrats in both 
Congresses. 
The Republicans became more unified in the 104th 
Congress when they held the majority as compared to their 
divisiveness in the 103rd Congress when in the minority. 
Their party unity rose from nearly 50% in the 103rd Congress 
to reach above 90% for two out of the three votes in the 
104th Congress. They were never as heavily weighted toward 
conservatism as Democrats were toward liberalism on the 
welfare indices. But, because both parties became more 
unified, they left little room for moderate positions or 
compromise, thus increasing party polarization. 
A regional analysis of the data reveals a similar 
pattern. Table 12 in the Appendix indicates that all 
regions were weighted toward the liberal end of the index, 
but the Northeast and East regions had the highest liberal 
to conservative index ratio with the two most liberal and 
the two most conservative categories equalling approximately 
8:2. Conversely, the Midwest showed the most conservative 
index for the 103rd Congress with an approximate 1:1 ratio. 
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The Southwest and East were ultimately dropped from the 
•
 
individual regional analysis due to their low sample size. 
In the individual regional examination, Table 13 
reveals that in the South, Republicans were split with the 
two most liberal categories equalling 14.6% and the two most 
conservative equalling 65.9%, but the Democrats were a 
little more galvanized with the liberal categories totaling 
71.5% and conservative totaling 2.9%. The West is a bit 
more unified for Republicans with the liberal faction 
totaling 10% and the conservative end of the index equalling 
79%. Democrats are again very unified with all votes in the 
two most liberal index categories. The Northeast, displayed 
in Table 15, again shows more unity by Democrats than 
Republicans with all Democrats in most" liberal categories 
and even Republicans weighted toward the liberal end of the 
index. Finally, Table 16 shows great polarization in the 
Midwest with 65% of Republicans in the two most conservative 
categories and all Democrats in the most liberal categories. 
All of these cross-tabulations are statistically significant 
at the .01 level. 
Tables 17 through 21 display the regional findings for 
the 104th Congress. The overall regional analysis indicates 
more polarization than in the 103rd Congress: this time, 
the Northeast and East are liberally-dominated, the West is 
split down the middle, and the South and Southwest are 
conservatively-dominated. Once again, the Southwest and 
East are dropped from the individual examination due to 
their low sample size. 
17
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The remaining regions show higher party polarization 
than those of the 103rd Congress, supporting the theoretical 
logic that party polarization may be determined by divided 
government and the Contract with America. Table 18 shows 
the complete unity of Southern Republicans with all in the 
two most conservative index categories. Unusually, this 
time Democrats are the least unified with all but 3.3% in 
the two most liberal categories. Table 19 indicates the 
polarization of the West with almost all Republicans in the 
two most conservative categories and all Democrats in the 
two most liberal categories. In the Northeast in Table 20, 
all Democrats were once again in the two most liberal 
categories, while the Republicans had only 88.9% in the two 
most conservative categories. Finally, in the Midwest, 
Table 21 indicates another complete polar split. Thus, the 
parties are more united by region as a whole and as 
individual areas like the South, West, Northeast, and 
Midwest. The Democrats are unified in every region for both 
Congresses, and the Republicans show a marked increase in 
unity, moving from moderate splits in the 103rd Congress to 
near absolute unity in all regions for the 104th Congress, 
thus augmenting party polarization on welfare issues. 
CONCLUSION 
The degree of partisanship demonstrated by the House 
after the Contract With America does increase despite the 
fact that conservative coalition scores increase rather than 
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decrease as expected. But, even though divided government 
and the Contract With America may determine party 
galvanization, Republicans do not show the same degree of 
partisanship on these welfare votes as Democrats either by 
region or as a whole. This contradicts the perception that 
the Republican party is a disciplined juggernaught that 
remains unified under all circumstances. Apparently, the 
perception that the Contract with America is the ultimate 
unifying force for the ultimately unified party is mistaken. 
For, it is the Democrats, and not the Republicans who show 
the most cohesiveness in these particular instances. 
FUTURE EXPANSION 
This research design can be expanded in at least two 
directions. It could test the theory forwarded by Robert S. 
Erikson and Gerald C. Wright in "Voters, Candidates, and 
Issues In Congressional Elections" that the most moderate 
Representatives corne from the most marginal districts and 
the most extreme Representatives corne from the safest 
districts. In accordance with that theory, the design could 
investigate whether or not the Representatives from the most 
marginal districts have the most moderate positions on 
welfare issues, and the Representatives with the greatest 
chance of getting re-elected easily have the most extreme 
positions on such issues. Another option is to expand this 
longitudinal study laterally to compare the votes of 
Representatives on foreign policy and budget issues to those 
•
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on welfare for the 103rd and 104th Congresses to see if 
welfare yates truly are more polarized than other types of 
yates. 
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APPENDIX 
103rd Congress 
Index/South/Southwest/West/Northeast/Midwest/East/Total 
0.0 /13.5%/ 14.3% /9.2% / 3.7% / 17.4% /9.1% /11.3% 42 
1.0 /12.6%/ 0% /22.4%/ 6.2% / 12.8% /0% /12.6% 47 
2.0 /10.8%/ 14.3% /3.9% / 7.4% / 15.1% /9.1% /9.7% 36 
3.0 /22.5%/ 14.3% /18.4%/ 19.8% / 7% /27.3%/17.5% 65 
4.0 /40.5%/ 57.1 /46.1%/ 63% / 47.7% /54.5%/48.9%182 
Total/29.8%/	 1.9% /20.4%/ 21.8% / 23.1% / 3% /100% 
111 7 76 81 86 11 372 
Pearson's = 37.636, Cramer's V = .15904, Significance = .01 
Table 13 -7I=n,,=,d=e=xL..;/=R7e~pu=b~l~i=-c;:;.;a=n=/-:-=D;;..;:e~m:;.:o:..:c:.=r:..::a:..:t:.L./,...:T~o:..::t~a:.=l,,- Pearson = 70.82 
South 0.0 / 36.6% / 0% /13.5% 15 Cramer'sV = .79 
1.0 /	 29.3% / 2.9% /12.6% 14 Sig. = .01 
2.0 /	 19.5% / 5.7% /10.8% 12 
3.0 /	 12.2% / 28.6% /22.5% 25 
4.0 /	 2.4% / 62.9% /40.5% 45 
Total/	 36.9% / 63.1% /100%
 
41 70 111
 
Table 14 Index/Republican/Democrat/Total Pearson = 64.759 
West 0.0 /23.3% / 0% /9.2% 7 Cramer'sV = .923 
1.0 /56.7% / 0% /22.4% 17 Sig. = .01 
2.0 /10% / 0% /3.9% 3 
3.0 /6.7% / 26.1% /18.4% 14 
4.0% /3.3% / 73.9% /46.1% 35 
Total/39.5% / 60.5% /100% 
30	 46 76 
Table 15 Index/Republican/Democrat/Total Pearson = 41.346
 
NortheastO.O / 9.4% / 0% /3.7% 3 Cramer'sV = .714
 
1.0 /	 15.6% / 0% /6.2% 5 Sig. = .01 
2.0 /	 18.8% / 0% /7.4% 6 
3.0 /	 34.4% / 10.2% /19.8% 16 
4.0 /	 21.9% / 89.8% /63% 51 
Total/	 39.5% / 60.5% /100%
 
32 49 81
 
Table 16 Index/Republican/Democrat/Total Pearson = 66.773
 
Midwest 0.0 / 37.5% / 0% /17.4% 15 Cramer'sV = .881
 
1.0 /	 27.5% / 0% /12.8% 11 Sig. = .01 
2.0 /	 25% / 6.5% /15.1% 13 
3.0 /	 7.5% / 6.5% /7% 6 
4.0 /	 2.5% / 87% /47.7% 41 
Total/	 46.5% / 53.5% /100%
 
40 46 86
 
•
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Index/South/southwest/West/Northeast/MidwestIEast/Total 
Pearson's = 24.430, Cramer's V = .13941, Significance = .01 
Table 18 Index/Republican/Democrat/Total Pearson = 126 
South 0.0 I 70.3% I 0% 138.8% 52 Cramer'sV =.97 
1.0 I	 29.7% I 3.3% 117.9% 24 Sig. = .01 
2.0 I	 0% I 8.3% 13.7% 5 
3.0 I	 0% I 88.3% 139.6% 53 
Totall	 55.2% I 44.8% 1100%
 
74 60 134
 
Table 19 Index/Republican/nemocrat/Total Pearson = 72.9 
West 0.0 I 75% I 0% 140% 30 Cramer'sV = .9 
..:.1...:..• ..=..0---J/"":--'2=-=2::....:.:....::5:...<.:%:.....-_L.: S i g. = • 0 1 I -=O%=--_----<.1.,...=1:..:2:..<.::%:.....-_----=-0 
2.0 I	 2.5% I 2.9% 12.7% 2 
3.0 I	 0% I 97.1% 145.3% 34 
Totall	 53.3% I 46.7% 1100%
 
40 35 75
 
Table 20 Index/Republican/nemocrat/Total Pearson = 84.7 
NortheastO.O I 37.8% I 0% 118.1% 17 Cramer'sV = .9 
..::.1...:..• ..=..0---J/"":--'5::..,:1:..;.;..:1:...<.:%:.....-_L.:1_0=%=--_----<.1.,...=2:....:4:..:.•..=.5=%__2=-=..3 S i g. = • 0 1 
2.0 I	 8.9% I 4.1% 16.4% 6 
3.0 I	 2.2% I 95.9% 151.1% 48 
Totall	 47.9% I 52.1% 1100%
 
45 49 94
 
Table 21 Index/Republican/Democrat/Total Pearson = 96 
Midwest 0.0 I 58.9% I 0% 134.4% 33 Cramer'sV = 1 
-=-1...:...-=-0---J/'-:-4~1=:-'.:....:1:..:.;%:.....--L.:/~O%'"7------<./':-':2;...:4=%'--:--__=_=_2 3 Si g. = • 0 1 
2.0 I	 0% I 5% 12.1% 2 
3.0 I	 0% I 95% 139.6% 38 
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